US MARINE CORPS WORLD WAR II
SGT. Delbert G. Adamson KIA Iwo Jima
USMC 26 MARINES, 5 MARINE Division
D+3, 22 Feb 45 Weather: Steady rain, poor visibility.
CT 26, with 5th TankBn (less one company) attached, moved out at daybreak and passed through CT 27 in resumption of the attack to seize (O-2; LT 126 reverting to CT 26 and LT 227 becoming attached to CT 26, effective on the passage of lines. LT 226 and LT 326 moved up to the front lines in a steady rain and under heavy mortar and artillery fire and completed passage of lines at about 0910. In passing through corresponding elements of CT 27, LT 326 had to extend about 200 yards into the zone of 4thMarDiv on the right, and LT 226 over-extended its right boundary for similar reason. Rather than attempt to adjust lines by lateral movement while under heavy enemy fire, it was decided to accomplish the same in advancing toward O-2. The attack advanced about 400 yards in the center, but in the right elements were unable to advance. The bluff line parallel to the direction of attack in the left of the zone of action of the 4thMarDiv completely dominated the zone of action of the 5thMarDiv. No part of this bluff was occupied by 4thMarDiv elements on this date. All forward elements of CT 26 received heavy artillery and mortar fire and the attacking troops were pinned down by heavy enfilade fire from positions in the bluff.
Frontal resistance, from pillboxes, was secondary to the above fires. Action of tanks in right of the zone was unsuccessful due to the heavy AT fire from the bluff positions. At about 0940 the CO of LT 326 (LtCol Tom M. Trotti) and the Bn-3 were killed. The Bn-X having already been wounded and evacuated, Major Richard Fagan was assigned command of LT 326. Between 1630 and 1800 and again at about 2200 uncoordinated counter-attacks on the left front, and to lesser extent in the center, were repulsed by artillery and infantry fire. At about 1700 LT 226 and the left of LT 326, holding completely untenable ground in the center salient, were forced to withdraw and all elements organized lines for the night on essentially the same positions from which attack was launched. Lines still extended well beyond the right CT boundary into the zone of the 3rdMarDiv (3rdMarDiv having taken over during the day from the 4thMarDiv).
Due to beach conditions a shortage of many items developed. However replacement batteries for radios were received late in the day and provided immediate improvement in SCR-300 communication. The need for usable roads leading to forward supply dumps became acutely felt.
Casualties: 5 Off, 95 Enl. Effective Strength: 137 Off, 2944 Enl.
Military Information: SGT, US MARINE CORPS
SGT. Delbert G. Adamson KIA Iwo Jima
USMC 26 MARINES, 5 MARINE Division
D+3, 22 Feb 45 Weather: Steady rain, poor visibility.
CT 26, with 5th TankBn (less one company) attached, moved out at daybreak and passed through CT 27 in resumption of the attack to seize (O-2; LT 126 reverting to CT 26 and LT 227 becoming attached to CT 26, effective on the passage of lines. LT 226 and LT 326 moved up to the front lines in a steady rain and under heavy mortar and artillery fire and completed passage of lines at about 0910. In passing through corresponding elements of CT 27, LT 326 had to extend about 200 yards into the zone of 4thMarDiv on the right, and LT 226 over-extended its right boundary for similar reason. Rather than attempt to adjust lines by lateral movement while under heavy enemy fire, it was decided to accomplish the same in advancing toward O-2. The attack advanced about 400 yards in the center, but in the right elements were unable to advance. The bluff line parallel to the direction of attack in the left of the zone of action of the 4thMarDiv completely dominated the zone of action of the 5thMarDiv. No part of this bluff was occupied by 4thMarDiv elements on this date. All forward elements of CT 26 received heavy artillery and mortar fire and the attacking troops were pinned down by heavy enfilade fire from positions in the bluff.
Frontal resistance, from pillboxes, was secondary to the above fires. Action of tanks in right of the zone was unsuccessful due to the heavy AT fire from the bluff positions. At about 0940 the CO of LT 326 (LtCol Tom M. Trotti) and the Bn-3 were killed. The Bn-X having already been wounded and evacuated, Major Richard Fagan was assigned command of LT 326. Between 1630 and 1800 and again at about 2200 uncoordinated counter-attacks on the left front, and to lesser extent in the center, were repulsed by artillery and infantry fire. At about 1700 LT 226 and the left of LT 326, holding completely untenable ground in the center salient, were forced to withdraw and all elements organized lines for the night on essentially the same positions from which attack was launched. Lines still extended well beyond the right CT boundary into the zone of the 3rdMarDiv (3rdMarDiv having taken over during the day from the 4thMarDiv).
Due to beach conditions a shortage of many items developed. However replacement batteries for radios were received late in the day and provided immediate improvement in SCR-300 communication. The need for usable roads leading to forward supply dumps became acutely felt.
Casualties: 5 Off, 95 Enl. Effective Strength: 137 Off, 2944 Enl.
Military Information: SGT, US MARINE CORPS
US MARINE CORPS WORLD WAR II
SGT. Delbert G. Adamson KIA Iwo Jima
USMC 26 MARINES, 5 MARINE Division
D+3, 22 Feb 45 Weather: Steady rain, poor visibility.
CT 26, with 5th TankBn (less one company) attached, moved out at daybreak and passed through CT 27 in resumption of the attack to seize (O-2; LT 126 reverting to CT 26 and LT 227 becoming attached to CT 26, effective on the passage of lines. LT 226 and LT 326 moved up to the front lines in a steady rain and under heavy mortar and artillery fire and completed passage of lines at about 0910. In passing through corresponding elements of CT 27, LT 326 had to extend about 200 yards into the zone of 4thMarDiv on the right, and LT 226 over-extended its right boundary for similar reason. Rather than attempt to adjust lines by lateral movement while under heavy enemy fire, it was decided to accomplish the same in advancing toward O-2. The attack advanced about 400 yards in the center, but in the right elements were unable to advance. The bluff line parallel to the direction of attack in the left of the zone of action of the 4thMarDiv completely dominated the zone of action of the 5thMarDiv. No part of this bluff was occupied by 4thMarDiv elements on this date. All forward elements of CT 26 received heavy artillery and mortar fire and the attacking troops were pinned down by heavy enfilade fire from positions in the bluff.
Frontal resistance, from pillboxes, was secondary to the above fires. Action of tanks in right of the zone was unsuccessful due to the heavy AT fire from the bluff positions. At about 0940 the CO of LT 326 (LtCol Tom M. Trotti) and the Bn-3 were killed. The Bn-X having already been wounded and evacuated, Major Richard Fagan was assigned command of LT 326. Between 1630 and 1800 and again at about 2200 uncoordinated counter-attacks on the left front, and to lesser extent in the center, were repulsed by artillery and infantry fire. At about 1700 LT 226 and the left of LT 326, holding completely untenable ground in the center salient, were forced to withdraw and all elements organized lines for the night on essentially the same positions from which attack was launched. Lines still extended well beyond the right CT boundary into the zone of the 3rdMarDiv (3rdMarDiv having taken over during the day from the 4thMarDiv).
Due to beach conditions a shortage of many items developed. However replacement batteries for radios were received late in the day and provided immediate improvement in SCR-300 communication. The need for usable roads leading to forward supply dumps became acutely felt.
Casualties: 5 Off, 95 Enl. Effective Strength: 137 Off, 2944 Enl.
Military Information: SGT, US MARINE CORPS
SGT. Delbert G. Adamson KIA Iwo Jima
USMC 26 MARINES, 5 MARINE Division
D+3, 22 Feb 45 Weather: Steady rain, poor visibility.
CT 26, with 5th TankBn (less one company) attached, moved out at daybreak and passed through CT 27 in resumption of the attack to seize (O-2; LT 126 reverting to CT 26 and LT 227 becoming attached to CT 26, effective on the passage of lines. LT 226 and LT 326 moved up to the front lines in a steady rain and under heavy mortar and artillery fire and completed passage of lines at about 0910. In passing through corresponding elements of CT 27, LT 326 had to extend about 200 yards into the zone of 4thMarDiv on the right, and LT 226 over-extended its right boundary for similar reason. Rather than attempt to adjust lines by lateral movement while under heavy enemy fire, it was decided to accomplish the same in advancing toward O-2. The attack advanced about 400 yards in the center, but in the right elements were unable to advance. The bluff line parallel to the direction of attack in the left of the zone of action of the 4thMarDiv completely dominated the zone of action of the 5thMarDiv. No part of this bluff was occupied by 4thMarDiv elements on this date. All forward elements of CT 26 received heavy artillery and mortar fire and the attacking troops were pinned down by heavy enfilade fire from positions in the bluff.
Frontal resistance, from pillboxes, was secondary to the above fires. Action of tanks in right of the zone was unsuccessful due to the heavy AT fire from the bluff positions. At about 0940 the CO of LT 326 (LtCol Tom M. Trotti) and the Bn-3 were killed. The Bn-X having already been wounded and evacuated, Major Richard Fagan was assigned command of LT 326. Between 1630 and 1800 and again at about 2200 uncoordinated counter-attacks on the left front, and to lesser extent in the center, were repulsed by artillery and infantry fire. At about 1700 LT 226 and the left of LT 326, holding completely untenable ground in the center salient, were forced to withdraw and all elements organized lines for the night on essentially the same positions from which attack was launched. Lines still extended well beyond the right CT boundary into the zone of the 3rdMarDiv (3rdMarDiv having taken over during the day from the 4thMarDiv).
Due to beach conditions a shortage of many items developed. However replacement batteries for radios were received late in the day and provided immediate improvement in SCR-300 communication. The need for usable roads leading to forward supply dumps became acutely felt.
Casualties: 5 Off, 95 Enl. Effective Strength: 137 Off, 2944 Enl.
Military Information: SGT, US MARINE CORPS
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