Delbrück was one of the first modern military historians, basing his method of research on the critical examination of ancient sources, the use of auxiliary disciplines, like demography and economics, to complete the analysis and the comparison between different epochs to trace the evolution of military institutions. His conclusions regarding ancient warfare were revolutionary. Delbrück showed that the figures for armies in antiquity were overinflated in the sources, and that, contrary to what is stated in most writings, the winner in a battle usually had more troops than the loser. He gave a completely new interpretation to some of the most famous battles in history, like Marathon, Gaugamela and Zama. He concluded that the advantage of Roman armies over the barbarians rested, not so much in their discipline and refined tactics, but rather in their logistical support. The Romans were able to raise and maintain huge armies on the field, while the barbarians were unable to match them. Regarding medieval warfare, Delbrück's findings were more controversial. He made a distinction between knights (mounted warriors) and cavalry (an organized mass of mounted troops), and regarded the medieval warrior as an independent fighter, unable to join others and form units with tactical significance. This conclusion was contested by later scholars, in particular Verbruggen. When moving into modern warfare, Delbrück showed his intellectual roots in Clausewitz. He made a distinction between two possible strategies in war: attrition and annihilation (compared to Clausewitz's total and limited war), the choice depending on political and economic limitations, as well as the correlation of forces. He applied this analytical tool to the wars of Frederick the Great, concluding that, due to their numerical inferiority, the Prussians had pursued a strategy of attrition. His overall treatment of this era was, however, disappointing, as Delbrück overlooked the Spanish wars.
Delbrück was also very critical of his country's strategy during World War I. He said it would have been much better to seek victory in the Eastern front, gain minor objectives on the West and then seek peace. This was one example of the general principle, Delbrück maintained, that military and political maneuvers should be integrated. Overall, Delbrück's works tried to place military history in the framework of general history. He regarded warfare as a cultural feature of societies, subject to evolution and influenced by the economy and the political system.
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hans_Delbr%C3%BCck
Delbrück was one of the first modern military historians, basing his method of research on the critical examination of ancient sources, the use of auxiliary disciplines, like demography and economics, to complete the analysis and the comparison between different epochs to trace the evolution of military institutions. His conclusions regarding ancient warfare were revolutionary. Delbrück showed that the figures for armies in antiquity were overinflated in the sources, and that, contrary to what is stated in most writings, the winner in a battle usually had more troops than the loser. He gave a completely new interpretation to some of the most famous battles in history, like Marathon, Gaugamela and Zama. He concluded that the advantage of Roman armies over the barbarians rested, not so much in their discipline and refined tactics, but rather in their logistical support. The Romans were able to raise and maintain huge armies on the field, while the barbarians were unable to match them. Regarding medieval warfare, Delbrück's findings were more controversial. He made a distinction between knights (mounted warriors) and cavalry (an organized mass of mounted troops), and regarded the medieval warrior as an independent fighter, unable to join others and form units with tactical significance. This conclusion was contested by later scholars, in particular Verbruggen. When moving into modern warfare, Delbrück showed his intellectual roots in Clausewitz. He made a distinction between two possible strategies in war: attrition and annihilation (compared to Clausewitz's total and limited war), the choice depending on political and economic limitations, as well as the correlation of forces. He applied this analytical tool to the wars of Frederick the Great, concluding that, due to their numerical inferiority, the Prussians had pursued a strategy of attrition. His overall treatment of this era was, however, disappointing, as Delbrück overlooked the Spanish wars.
Delbrück was also very critical of his country's strategy during World War I. He said it would have been much better to seek victory in the Eastern front, gain minor objectives on the West and then seek peace. This was one example of the general principle, Delbrück maintained, that military and political maneuvers should be integrated. Overall, Delbrück's works tried to place military history in the framework of general history. He regarded warfare as a cultural feature of societies, subject to evolution and influenced by the economy and the political system.
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hans_Delbr%C3%BCck
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